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Case No. 8638

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT'S AND APPELL.ANTS

STATE~fENT

OF FACTS

On November 8, 1956, the Board 'Of Commissioners
of Salt Lake City passed .an ordinance which, as amended
on November 15, 1956, reads as follows:
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"Section 32-2-1. PROHIBITION OF BAGATEijLE, P I N B A L L AND MARBLE MACHINES, ETC. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation or any other group or
association of individuals however styled or designated, to keep, use, maintain, possess, permit, al}ow,.or hiVe un<Ie'r control, or p1ake av.ailableill
.any store or place of business or establishllieilt
in which the public may enter or be upon, or in
any other place of public resort, or in any place
of business, club, association, or establishment
where without warrant the right of direct police
inspection exists within the corporate limits of
S~alt Lake City, either as owner, bailee, lessee,
agent, employee, mortgagee or otherwise, any of
the following where the operation, use or play of
which is controlled or set in operation by the deposit of any coin, plate, disk, plug, key or other
subject or by the payment of any fee or charge:
" (a) Any game of bagatelle, pigeonhole or
device or contrivance commonly known
as pin game, pin ball game, marble,
one shot marble game ;
"(b) Any game, device, contrivance or machine which contains a pay-off or .award
device or meehanisn1 for the return of
1noney, coins, slugs, ehecks, credit,
tokens or for the deliYery of anything
of value or representing or exchangeable or redee1nnble for anything of
value : provided, that this section shall
not rover the iten1s included in Section
~ of this ordinance .
.. Section 32-~-~. EXCLlTSIONS. The provisions of this ordinance shall not apply to Inachines, deviees, or contrivances "Thieh are used,
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operated or maintained exclusively for the purpose of dispensing and sale of merchandise or
producing mu.sic or providing rides or showing
of pictures.
"Section 32-2-3. PENALTY. Any person
violating any provisions of this ordi.."'tance is
guilty of a misde.meanor and upon conviction
thereof shall be punished by a fine not more than
T·wo Hundred Ninety Nine and 00/100 Dollars
($299.00) or by imprisonment in the County Jail
not to exceed six (6) months, or both such fine
and imprisonment.
"Section 32-2-4. LICENSE NO DEFENSE.
The fact that any machine, table, device, game
or contrivance mentioned in this ordinance may
have been licensed under the licensing authorities
or that a tax for the operation thereof may have
been paid, shall constitute no defense to any action
or prosecution brought under the provisions of
ihis ordinance.
"Section 32-2-5. SEPARABILITY CLAUSE.
It is the intention of the Board of Commissioners
of Salt Lake City thrut each separate provision
of each section of this ordinance shall be deemed
independent of all other provisions of said sections and of each of them and it is further the
intention of the Board of Commissioners of Salt
Lake City that if any provision of said sections
or any of them be declared invalid for any purpose or application, all other provisions thereof
shall remain valid and enforceable.
"Section 32-2-6. REVOCATION OF LIC'ENSE. The Board of Commissioners ·of Salt
Lake City m.ay revoke any type of license of any
licensee issued by Salt Lake City for any violation of this ordinance by such licensee.
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"Section 32-2-7. All ordinances or parts of
ordinances in conflict herewith are hereby repealed.''
Subsequent to the enactment of this ordinance and
before its scheduled effective date, the District Court
of Salt Lake County on December 27, 1956, entered a
temporary restraining order against enforcement of the
ordinance and an order to show cause why defendants
should not be permanently enjoined from the enforcement of the ordinance.
On January 10, 1957 the District Court entered its
decision holding the ordinance invalid. The final paragraph of the Court'.s decision reads as follows:
"It would seem that the ordinance in question
goes beyond that involved in the Lawrence case
and goes beyond the power conferred upon the
city by the Legislature, and it is the decision of
this court that the ordinance referred to above
is unconstitutional."
The judg1nent dated January 25, 1957 reads in part
af' follo"?s:
"'. . . that Chapter 2, as amended, of Title
;~~ of the ReYised Ordinances of Salt Lake City
1955 goes beyond the power conferred upon Salt
T.~a kP Cit~· hy il1e Legislature of the State of
LTtah and that the said ordinance is ultra virus.''

BT..:\TEl\IENT OF POINTS
POINT 1.
CHAPTER 2 OF TITLE 32 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT LAI~E CITY. 1955, DEALING WITH PINBALL MACHINES AND OTHER SIMILAR DEVICES, CONSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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STITUTES A VALID EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER
OF SALT LAKE CITY AND IS NOT VIOLATE OF ·CONSTITU'TIONAL DUE PROCESS.
POINT 2.
CHAPTER 2 OF TITLE 32 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, 1955, DEALING WITH PINBALL MACHINES AND OTHER SIMILAR DEVICES, IS
LAWFULLY WITHIN THE POWER CONFERRED UPON
SALT LAKE CITY BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE
OF UTAH.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
CHAPTER 2 OF TITLE 32 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, 1955, DEALING WITH PINBALL MACHINES AND OTHER SIMILAR DEVICES, CONSTITUTES A VALID EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER
OF SALT LAKE CITY AND IS N,OT VIOLATE OF ·CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS.

On a b.asis substantially the same, in terms of language of the ordinance and devices suppressec\ as the
ordinance no'v before the court, the authorities universally uphold .such an enactment on the theory that the
prevalence of the devices, their tendency to foster the
gambling instinct, their adaptability to gan1bling, and
their known temptation to school children anrl minors,
cons~titute .ample legal justification in curbing the machines by restrictive regulations. In 6 JfcQuill,·n Mtttn icipal Corporations, page 683, it is stated:
" ... But as is well kno\vn, marble .and pin ball
games and the like frequently are gambling devices or readily converted into such by a mere
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mechanical adjustment or by their use for wagering. Snyder v. Alliance, 41 Ohio App. 48, 179
N.E. 426; Coleman v. ·Chicago, 297 Ill. App. 130,
17 N.E. (2d) 365; Baker v. City of LaFayette,
202 Ga. 666, 44 S.E. (2d) 255. Consequently, it
is not surprising that municip-al and state gaming
legislation in many instances is directed at all
such devices for 'skill' or 'pleasure' as well ~
at those which definitely are gaming devices.
Woodward v. City of Lithonia, 191 Ga. 234, 11
S.E. (2d) 476. It has been observed that ordinarily
the evil or dangerous character of outlawed
articles is clear and obvious, but the power to
abate a nuisance by forbidding the possession
of certain articles may be exercised with respect
to articles which are entirely harmless when
properly used or controlled. Dallmann v. Kluchesky, 229 Wis. 169, 282 N.W. 9. This is true
with r·espect to marble, pin ball and other table
or mechanical 'skill' or 'ple~ure' games, with
respect to their potential use for gambling. Dallmann v. Kluchesh.··-y, 229 \V"is. 169, 282 N.\r. 9.
Accordingly, under power to provide for the government and good order of the city, an ordinance
prohibiting the possession of table games, basketball machines and the like, "ithout regard to
their actual use for grunbling purposes, is valid
as protective of the "~eifare of the youth of the
city. Dalln1ann v. Klurhesky, 229 ''Tis. 169, 282
N.,V. 9. Thus, such an ordinanee prohibiting pin
ball or silnilnr nu1chines for grunes of chanee or
skill is not Yiolative of due process of la'Y as
required by the federal 8Jld state constitutions.
'Vood"~ard Y. City of Lithonia, 191 Ga. 234, 11
S.E. (2d) -l-7G. Nor is such an ordinance void as
unreasonable because its effect is to coinpletely
destroy and confiscate the business 8Jld property
of persons possessed of such n1achines at the tiine
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of the enactment of the ordinance. Woodward
v. City of Lithonia, 191 Ga. 234, 11 S.E. ( 2d)
476."
Other authorities are universally to the same effect
as those supporting the law announced in the foregoing
quotation. In the case of Columbus Legal Amusement
Association v. City of Col~t1nbus, 79 N.E. 2d 915, it is
stated at page 919, as follows:
"The unrestricted and unregulated use of
amusement device.s operated by coins or slugs,
wherein there is a certain element of chance, even
though not classified .as gambling devices, may
reasonably present a question involving the public
welfare or the public morals. It would not .seem
necessary to develop this fact because it is commonly understood. 'The problem presented to the
city is increased and made more difficult where
there is presented in a limited space many such
devices varying in type and allure, but all intended to have .an appeal to the public, and especially the youth. Manifest .such devices may be
innocent enough in themselves, or if properly
supervised but if not regulated, may readily be
the means of offending against public morals."
Similarly, in the case of Savoy Vending Co., Inc.
v. Valentine Police Co1nrnissioner of the City of N eu'
York, 33 N.Y. Supp. 2d 324, the court states at page 327,
as follows:
"It is needless to burden this writing with a
complete resume of what the answering affidavits
contain. Two fundamental points, however, have
been made patently and painfully clear. First,
the sponsors of coin operated machines, invariably, have not aimed to respect the law, but
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rath,er to evade it, and second, the effects upon
youth h-ave been evil. A few references will suffice. The industry stimulates the gambling instinct among young people and children of school
age. Machines located in neighborhood candy and
station~ery stores, in ice cream parlors and similar
establishments attract patronage to these places,
which become 'hang-outs' for children of all ages.
Many of the devices are in locations within a
block of public and parochial schools and are
operated by pennies as well as nickels. It is hardly
likely that the child who has no lack of opportunities for play and clean amusement is drawn from
his healthy associations to squander lunch money
and often hard earned spending money upon the
play of coin-op·erated machines for mere amusenlent. It is the lure and enticement of a hoped
for but never realized easy gain. And there we
have the beginning of a hold upon fancy and
imagination that increases its demand, nutured by
unsavory associates until, too late, the path of
petty crime, juvenile delinquency and hardened
criminality has claimed another victim."
Ag.~1in,

in the case of State Ex Rel. Green, Depu,ty
Solicitor, ~+1 Ala. -!55, 3 So. 2d 27, the Supre1ne Court
of .Alaha1na

~aid:

"We think it clear enough fro1n the language
of thi~ act, especially definition (d), that the la-\v

1naking body deen1ed it nece.ssary to prohibit all
such llUlchines .and devices 'vhich could be operated as n. gaJne of ehanee, regardless as to ""'hether
t.hPrP 'ras a 'pa.y-off' or not~ in order to fully
suppress the gau1bling evil. That this 'vas "'"ithin
t.hP police povver of the State and violated no
provision of the consti,tution, either State or
Federal, is well den1onstra.ted in the Eccles ease,
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supra, as well as in our own case of State Ex.
Rei. Wilkinson v. Murphy, 237 Ala. 332, 186 So.
487."
Many additional authorities are to the same effect:
J. L. Mttrphy v. People of the State of California, 225
U.S. 623, 56 L. Ed. 1229; Woodward v. City of Lithonia,
191 Ga. 23-J-, 11 S.E. 2d 476; Dall1nann v. Kluchesky,
229 Wis. 169, 282 N.W. 9; State v. Wiley, 232 Iowa 443,
3 N.W. 2d 620.
It appears therefore that the Legislative bodies of
various municipalities throughout the nation have seen
fit to suppress these devices in a fashion similar to
the ordinance of Salt Lake City. One particular very
instructive and informative case treats virtually every
contention raised by plaintiffs in their p·etition for an
order to show cause. The California case of Ex Parte
Lawrence, 55 Cal. App. 2d 491, 131 P. 2d 27, concerns
an ordinance of Long Beach very similar to defendant's
enactment. The language of the Long Beach ordinance
follows:
"Sec. 235.02. Possession of Certain Games
Prohibited. It shall be unlawful for any person,
finn or corporation to keep, maintain, possess
or have under control in any place of business,
or in any other place of public resort, either as
owner, les.see, agent, employee, morgagee or otherwise, any table game or device commonly known
as a 'pin game,' 'pin ball game,' 'marble game,'
'one shot marble game,' 'horse race machine,'
claw, scoop or grab machine, or any automatic
pay-off machine, the operation, use or play of
which is controlled by placing therein any coin,
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plate, disk, plug, key or other device, or by the
payment of any fe-e."
This well reasoned opinion of Ex Parte Lawrence,
supra, is supported by appropriate citation of ample
authority including the Supreme Court of the United
States. A brief comparison bet,veen the allegation.s of
plaintiffs' petition and the law announced in the Lawrence case is appropriate.
In Paragraph 4 of plaintiffs' petition it is contended
specifically that the ordinance is not within the scope
of the police po,ver. To this contention the California
court said:
"Such power is as broad as public welfare
(State v. Mountain Timber Co., 75 Wash. 581,
135 P. 645, L.R.A. 1917D, 10), is 'coextensive
with the necessities of the situation' (In re Santos,
88 c·a1. App. 691, 264 P. 281, 283) and all property is subject to the proper exercise of the police
power, as the Supreme Court declared in Ex
parte Quong W o, 161 Cal. 220, 118 P. 714. Indeed
it has been repeatedly held that a business lawful
in itself is not so protected, even by the Fourteenth A1nendn1ent, that it cannot be regulated
out of bu.siness by the adoption of regulatory
ordinances under the police powers. Such was
the situation in the case of Ex parte ~Iurphy, 8
Cal. App. ~40, 97 P. 199, "~here the city of South
Pa8adena adopted .an ordinance prohibiting the
1nn.in tenanee of poolroo1ns or billiard parlors for
hi rP: nnd altl1ough the question "'as presented
to the Supreme Court of the lTnited States, petitionPr in that c.ase re·presenting that he w·as
hPing legislated out of his business and being
deprived of his property without due process of
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law, no relief was afforded him, the highest court
affirming the right of the local governing body
to adopt the ordinance in question (Murphy v.
State of California, 225 U.S. 623, 32 S. Ct. 697,
56 L. Ed. 1229, 41 L.R.A., N.S., 153). Upon this
proposition the Supreme Court of the state likewise has unequivocally declared itself that all
property is held subject to the exercise of police
power and that constitutional provisions against
the imp.airment of contracts and the taking of
property without due process of law have no
application as against the right of duly constituted legislative bodies to regulate property in
the proper exercise of the police powers. Odd
Fellows' Cemetary Ass'n v. City and County of
San Francisco, 140 Cal. 226, 73 P. 987; In re
Zhizhuzza, 147 Cal. 328, 81 P. 955."
In paragraph 6 of plaintiffs' petition it is contended
that property is taken without due process of law and
that the ordinance bears no relation to public health
or morals. Again, in the Lawrence case the California
court answered a similar contention, as follows :
". . . Plainly, petitioner was bound to know
that his activity in maintaining the games in
question, "\vhile lawful in itself, i.e., not interdicted by state or federal law, was yet subject
to municipal regulatory measure.s within the scope
of the police power conferred upon municipalities
by the state Constitution and by statutory enactments."
" . . . A similar enactment in Alabama
tirely prohibiting such machines was held by
Supreme Court of that stat.e to be within
lawful exercise of the police power (State ex
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Green v. One 5c Fifth Inning Baseball Machine,
241 Ala. 455, 3 So. 2d 27); and as above pointed
out, in Murphy v. State of California, 225 U.S.
623, 32 S. Ct. 697, 56 L. Ed. 1229, 41 L.R.A., N.S.,
153, South Pasadena Municipal legislation prohibiting poolhalls for hire as unlawful was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Similar regulatory ordinances without number
have met with judicial approval. Even if the
business regulated has not yet become injurious
or offensive but in the sound discretion of the
legislative body may become so, it is the proper
subject of regulatory legislation. In re Pedrosian,
124 Cal. App. 692, 13 P. 2d 389."
The California court conclude_s "\Yith the statement
th·at, "In fact, we have been pointed to no opinion holding
such regulation unreasonable."
The case of Bountiful City L". DeLuca, 77 l~tah 107,
292 P. 194, involved an action to restrain defendants
fro1n per1nitting goats to graze within 300 feet of a
stream contrary to an ordinance p.assed under an enabling ~tatnte designed to giYe the city the po,ver to
protect its \Yater shed fron1 pollution.....:\fter judginent
for the City~ on appeal tl1e case "\Yas reYersed. The
Snprt>lllt\ Court held that the unla"\lfnl arts charged were
not ~upport('d hy the t'Yidenre, but if the acts had been
~o ~upportP(l tht' ease \\~ould haYe been affir1ned. The
('011 rt

r<'.n ~onPd that the defendants "\Yere doing eYery-

thing po~~ible to pr<:'Yent a pollution of the stream:
that tiH' eit~~ ~hould haYe diYerted the "\Yater at a differPnt point, thus nYt'rting the problen1. The court said:
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". . . that every one must use hi.s property
so as not to unreasonably or lmnecessarily injure
others, and that he holds his p~roperty and the
use and enjoyment of it subject to a reasonable
and lawful exercise of the police power and to
such reasonable re.straints and regulations over
it as the legislature within its governing and
controlling power vested in it may deem necessary and expedient to protect and promote public
health, public safety, morals, and general welfare;
that the state may without compensation regulate
and restrain the use of private prop~erty when
the health, safety, morals, or welfare of the public
requires or demands it; ... " (Emphasis added)
The Utah Court held further that the lawful exercise of the police povver may deprive the owner of all
profitable use of his property if it is injurious or pernicious to the public health or welfare. Thus, the Bountiful
City case is, contrary to plaintiffs' position, substantial
authority for upholding the subject enactment of Salt
Lake City since that case involved a business which in
no way has factors inherently of an injurious character
to the health and welfare of the people as is the case
here. Moreover, it is important to note that the Salt
Lake City ordinance does not absolutely prohibit the
possession and use of the variou.s devices, but rather
the devices are suppressed only in places of public
resort .and in those establishments where without warrant
the right of direct police inspection exists. Hence, the
ordinance is regulatory and is not an absolute pTohibition. This distinction is made clear in the California
case of Ex Parte Lawrence, supra.
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The case of Utah Manufact1trers Association v.
Stewart, 82 Utah 198, 23 P. 2d 229, holds that a statute
authorizing the Governor to designate exclu.sive warehouses for distribution of alcohol was a valid exercise
of the police power. l\Ioreover, a statement by the court
bears emphasis, as follows :
"It is well settled that the courts will not
declare an act of the Legislature unconstitutional
unless it clearly and manifestly violates some provision of the state or Federal :c·onstitution. Every
presumption will be indulged in favor of constitutionality and every reasonable doubt resolved
in favor of validity. State v. Packer Corporation,
77 Utah 500, 297 P. 1013. When legislative action
is within the scope of the police power, fairly
debatable questions as to reasonableness, wisdom, or propriety are not for courts but for the
Legislature. Standard Oil Co. v. Marysville, 279
U.S. 582, 49 S. Ct. 430, 73 L. Ed. 856 ... "
(Emphasis added)
The underlined portion of the foregoing quotation
we respectfully contend deprives the courts of all power
to resolve any question "~ith respect to the \visdon1 or
propriety of the ordinance.
Oth~r

Utah easc. s should be called to the attention
of the court. In State r. Briggs. 46 lTtah 2SS~ 146 P.
261, thP SuprPine Court upheld a conYiction for haYing
sold Jiquor in Yiola.tion of a local option statute. The
rourt snid:

". . . All the constitutional provisions, ho"Tever, respecting the rights of acquiring, possessin<.,.
and protecting p·roperty. in \Yhatever terms
t"'
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expressed, must nevertheless be construed and
applied in connection with the police power of
the state, unless it is in express terms otherwise provided in the Constitution itself ... "
The recent Utah case of Candas et al. v. Board of
Salt Lake County Commissioners, et al., 5 Utah 2d 1, 295
P. 2d 829, upheld the validity of a county ordinance
defining a nuisance a.s a place where dancing is p·ern1itted
on premises licensed for the sale of beer. The language
of Justice Worthen in a concurring opinion is of particular importance to the facts of this case. Justice
Worthen said:
"Every man who engages in a business which
is considered as questionable -and which to a
greater or less degree violates the social and
moral standards espoused by a substantial part
of society must do so faced with the possibility
that the operation of such business is not one of
absolute right, but one permitted and tolerated
with some reservation."
In the ease of Shaw v. Ore1n City, 117 Utah 288, 214
P. 2d 888, the Supreme Court of Utah upheld an
ordinance of Orer.a City prohibiting sale of beer art retail
on Sunday. The court pointed out that the Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, Title 10-8-84 confers upon a city the
power to enact such ordinances and regulation "as are,
necessary and proper to provide for the safety and
preserve the health, and pro1note the prosperity, improve
the morals, peace and good order, cornfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof ...."
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l\Ioreover, the Supreme Court in the Sha'lo case
reasoned that a specific enabling statute existed. Again
in succeeding sections of this brief we vvill point out that
Salt Lake City is acting under lawful authority granted
by the Legislature.
POINT 2.
CHAPTER 2 OF TITLE 32 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, 1955, DEALING WITH PINBALL MACHINES AND OTHER SIMILAR DEVICES, IS
LAWFULLY WITHIN THE POWER CONFERRED UPON
SALT LAKE CITY BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE
OF UTAH.

As indicated in the foregoing, the l~tah Code Annotated, 1953, Title 10-8-84, confers upon cities the general
powers to pass ordinances and regulations "such as are
necessary and proper to provide for the s~t~~ and preserve the health, and pro1note the prosperitv, improve
the worals, ne.ace and good order, co1nfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof . . . . ~' In
addition to this general grant of police po,ver "rhich is
sufficient to sustain the subject ordinance no\v before the
court, a particular and specific grant of po,ver exists in
l · tah Code ..:\nnotated, 1953, Title 10-S--±0~ ,,~hich proyjd~\s as follo\Ys:
"ThPy 1nny license~ tax . regulate and suppress
hilliard, pooL ba~qatcllc. pigeonhole or otlzer tables

or in1 p!cJucuts kept or used for siJnilar purposes.-"·
( ]1~n1phnsis added.)
'ro rprrtdn t(' the Yn rion8 1naehines .and deYices contninP<l in thf" ordinancP h~~ suppression in places of public
~
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resort and in other places of busines_s or establishments
vvhere vvithout warrant the right of direct police inspection exists, is a proper exercise of the povver conferred
upon Salt Lake City by the Legislature of the State
of Utah. The universal holding of the many authorities
previously cited conclusively show that these machines
may be entirely prohibited from the corporate limits of
the legislative body. But here, as indicated in the foregoing, the scope of the ordinance amounts to a mere
suppression and not a complete prohibition in thart the
1nachines are generally proscribed only in places of public resort. In the California ca:se of Ex Parte Lawrence,
supr.a, the following language appears :
"In his argument on the point whether the
ordinance here in review bears any real or substantial relation to the public health, mor.als,
safety or general welfare (which it is admitte·d is
the test to be applied to this inquiry), petitioner
fails to discriminate between two classes of cases,
one of which deals with ordinances which prohibit
entirely lawful businesses and occupations and
the other of which seeks only to regulate such
businesses. Cases such as People v. Hawley, 207
Cal. 395, 279 P. 136; Pacific Rys Advertising Co.
v. Oakland, 98 Cal. App. 165, 276 P. 629, and
others of like tenor cited by petitioner, either expressly or in effect prohibit entirely the lawful
businesses or occupations under consideration
therein. In the case now before us, regulation,
not prohibition, is decreed by the ordinance. The
games are proscribed only in places of business
or in any other 'place of public re_sort,' and exception is made of the amusement zones described
in another Long Beach ordinance. In other words,
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'pin ball' and ·other games denominated in the
ordinance may be maintained at private houses or
in certain delineated amusement zones, but not
generally in places of business or public resort.
The ordinance i~ not prohibitory but regulatory
only, and as such is unquestionably within the
scope and purview of the police power."
In the case of American Fork City v. Robinson, 77
Utah 168, 292 P. 249, an ordinance only regulating use
by club members of billiard and pool tables was held
invalid. Several major distinguishing features exists in
the case no-vv before the court. In the American Fork
case the opinion sp·ecifically notes that an ordinance
existed prohibiting "the keeping for use in any p1.tblic
place in the city any billiard or pool table.'' (Emphasis
added.) This particular ordinance was not attacked
in the case and by inference and express language it
is recognized that a prohibition in places of public re.sort
is within the po,ver conferred upon a municipality by
the Legislature. In this regard, it is iluportant to note
that the ordinance of Salt Lake City suppresses the pin
ball machines and other siinilar devices in places of
public resort and in those business establisluuents \Yhere
\vithout ",.arrant the right of direct police inspection
Pxi~t~. lienee, under the A.1nerican Fork decision the
provi~ions of the Salt Lake (--.ity ordinance suppressing
thP n1achinrs in places of public resort cannot be Yalidly
nt t ackPd.
1\dntitt<~dly, included in the Salt Lake City ordinance
h~ thr ph ra~P "or in n.ny place of business, club, association, or estahlislunent \vhrre \Yithout \rarrant the right.
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19·
of direct police inspection exists" which covers establishments sirnilar to those involved in the American Fork
decision. However, the court held the ordinance invalid
because it purported to regulate the sole subject of use;
by club members and "did not deal with the subject
of keeping billiard or pool tables . . ." The Supreme
Court recognized that the ordinance would have been
v.alid if it had included the power of regulation and
suppression in keeping the billiard and pool tables, which
is precisely what SaLt Lake City has done with respect
to pin ball machines. It is stated in the ca.se as follows:
"Part of the ordinance in question does not deal with the
subject of keeping billiard or pool tables .... "
Additionally the foregoing cases h.ave outlined the
evils \vhich the ordinance is designed to extirpate. More
compelling reasons exist for the supre.ssion of pin ball
machines than those supporting the ban on billiard or
pool tables in the American Fork ease, .and hence, restriction of pin ball machines under the power to "improve
the morals, peace and good order . . . of the city .and
the inhabitants thereof ... " is proper and valid.
In other words, the American Fork ordinance was
not sufficiently broad to qualify under the enabling act
since the restriction concerned only the use of the tables,
and hence, the ordinance purported only to control the
conduct of club members and not their conduct in rela~
tion to devices \Vhich had been validly prohibited under
the enabling act. This is the only reasonable interpretation of the case and is consistent with the unanimous body
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of judicial authority supporting the prohibition of pin
ball game.s.
We must conclude, therefore, that the .American
Fork case stands as authority for the position taken by
Salt Lake City in enacting the ordinance in question.
The phrase "place of public resort'' as used in the
ordinance now before the court means a place resorted
to by the public for the use of the designated machines,
Shaw v. Carpenter, 54 Vt. 155, 161, 41 Am. Rep. 837.
The phrase does not include private businesses where the
public does not resort for the use of the machines.
Harvey, Inc. v. Sissle, 53 Ohio App. 405, 5 N.E. 2d 410.
Nor by very definition does the phrase include any other
private home or establishment. The machines may be
warehoused, sold, repaired and used. It is only the scope
of the possession and use which is restrained.
The test is whether the general public has con1111on
use of the 1nachines, is allo,ved to enter and play the
machines 'vithout special invitation, and Ina~~ come and
go without restraint. Ballentine La"~ Dictionary, Ser.ond Ed., page 10-±G ~ 24 An1. J ur. ±lS.
The .sole exception to the suppression of the nlachinr~ only in plaees of public resort is in thos.e places
'',vhPre \\·ithout \\·arrant n right of direct police inspection
0Xi~t ~.
rrhis t'Xel'ption is coyered by the right of police
offiePrs to <'Hh\r elubroo1ns of non profit corporations,
as .sP{ l'orth in l Tt ah Codt' . .~\nnotated~ 1953, Title 16-6-1-±.
It is in tlH'S<' so-eallt'd priYate clubs "There the evils
<·reatP<l hy ntnchinl'S nrc· 1nagnified.
H
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Hence, a broad segment of our society remains unaffected by the ordinance which covers only the ques·tion
of public morals as such, and amount.s only to a suppression rather than an outright prohibition of possession and use of the machines.
That the Legisl~ature intended to gr.ant cities sub ..
stantial powers of suppression is clearly shown by
analogy to the enabling statutes for counties of the state
vvhere the power is included completely to prohibit the
possession and use of the machines.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Title 17-5-27 provides as
follows:
" ... they may license, tax, regulate, suppress
and prohibit billiard, bagatelle, pigeonhole, or any
other tables or implements kept or used for similar purposes ; . . ." (Empha.sis added.)
It is inconceivable that the Legislature intended to
grant broad powers of prohibition to counties without
granting to cities substantial powers of suppression.
Actually, the ter1ns "prohibit" .and "suppress" are virtually synonomous. Schwuchow v. City of Chicago, 68 Ill..
444. "Supress" means to prevent, put down or end by
force. Ogden v. City of Madison, 111 Wis. 413, 87 N.W.
568, 569. The word "suppress" is equivalent to prohibit,
put down or end by force. State v. Mu.stachia, 152 La.
821, 94 So. 408.
The word "suppre.ss" is defined in Webster's New
International Dictionary, Second Edition, 1934, as
follows:
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" 'Suppress' - to put down or out of existence by authority, force or pressure; to quell; to
crush; to subdue; to force inrto impotence or obscurity; to extinguish by prohibiting, dissolving,
etc.; as, to suppress a revolt, a religious order, or
freedom of speech. To keep from public knowledge ; as (a) to refrain from divulging; to leave
undisclosed; as, to suppress all names in an account of a scandal. (b) to prohibit or interdict
the publication or revelntion of; to withhold from
circulation; as, to suppress the truth, a rumor or a
book."
In any .event the ordinance of Salt Lake City .amounts
only to a suppression of the machines as the case of Ex
Parte Lau;rence, supra, makes abundantly clear. The
effect is not, as stated by the lower court, an absolute
prohibition. The scope of the ordinance is shown by the
foregoing analysis. To say, as inferred by the lower court
in its decision, that the ordinance would be valid had use
of the machines been .allo"~ed in public an1u.sen1ent parks,
amounts to the court acting as a superior legisla.ti'e body
completely ignoring the intent of the Legislature to grant
cities broad po,vers of suppres.sion of the subject
maehines.
Thr Utah ease of ~Tasfell r. Ogden City, 249 P. 2d
!l07 is enti re]~T consistent "Tith the subject ordinance now
hrfor<.' the court. The po"Ter to pass the ordinanee is
g-ran h'd by (\Xpres.s "Tords or at the very least is necesRarily jn1plied. Salt Lake C£ty 'V. Rereuu,e, 101 Utah 504,
12~ P. ~d 5:37. ''Te contend tltat the ordinance is a valid
PX<'rri ~r of t.lH' polirP po,rer, in har1nony ''ith the enabling- statnh's, nnd et'rtainly the Nas.fell ease is authority
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only for situations where cities have exceeded granted
powers. The language of Justice Crockett in the dis.senting opinion bears emphasis, as follows:

"I expressly agree with Mr. Chief Justice
Wolfe's statement, 'some of our holdings we have
too narrowly construed the granted powers.' No
better examples of this could be pointed out than
those cited in the prevailing opinion. Narrow to
the point of being unreasonable (as it seems to
me) are the holdings : that to regulate and suppress billiard tables did not authorize an ordinance prohibiting billiard playing .. ."' (American
Fork City v. Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 P. 249).
In ,2 Sutherland Statutory Construction at page 326,
the universal rule is recognized that every presumption
favor.s the validity of an act of the Legislative body. And
so in the case of Price v. Tuttle, 70 Utah 156, 258 P. 1016,
the Utah Supreme Court recognized the duty of the
courts to construe a statute and consider not only the
language of the act, hut also the purpose and objects
sought by the Legislative body.
CONCLUSION
The authorities are uniformly consistent in holding
that a suppression of pin ball machine.s and other similar
devises is a valid exercise of the police power. The apparent evils have been listed and discussed throughout the
decisions, and the evils created by the p-revalence of the
devices and the resulting injury to public morals and
welfare have been treated by the Legislature in granting
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to cities the power to suppress the machines. Scope of
the suppression is not a valid subject for judicial inquiry.
The lower court's decision is, therefore, an unwarranted
interference with the legislative proce.ss and should be
reversed.
E. R. CHRISTENSEN

City Attorney
DONALD B. HOLBROOK

Assistant City Attorney
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